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“The best job I ever had.”2 
 After decades of public service in all three branches of 
government, that is how congressman, federal D.C. circuit judge, 
White House counsel, law professor, and Presidential Medal of 
Freedom recipient Abner J. Mikva recalled his judicial clerkship 
with Justice Sherman Minton, his first position after law school. 
 Usually for a formal year or two, but frequently with informal 
permanence fortified by lifelong mutual respect, the judge 
remains the law clerk’s true professional mentor. Retired Admiral 
James G. Stavridis is right: “True instinctive 
mentors take the responsibility of mentorship 
seriously and go about it in a systematic and 
organized way.”3 True mentorship stands the test 
of time.
 Clerking is a privilege. Fresh out of law school 
and eager to begin their careers, law clerks at any 
level of the federal or state judiciary covet the 
opportunity to learn from a judge’s reservoir of 
knowledge. But law clerks who anticipate careers 
writing as advocates are also well-positioned to 
learn about something that a judge may not know 
when briefs or other adversary submissions land on 
the desk.
 That “something” concerns jargon, this article’s 
focus because its use by advocates can impede the 
court’s understanding of a case’s facts and law.4 “Jargon” refers 
to “special words or expressions that are used by a particular 
profession or group and are difficult for others to understand.”5 
Given the sheer complexity of much contemporary federal and 
state litigation, judges sometimes find themselves in the “others” 
category.
“Alien Landscapes”
 To specialists who frequently write to other specialists, jargon 
may come naturally even when non-specialists comprise the 
audience. Resort to jargon may also seem a convenient shortcut, 
supplanting the need for fuller explanation. Like many seeming 
shortcuts, however, an advocate’s use of jargon in briefs and other 
written submissions can end up exacting a heavy price. Jargon can 
strew hurdles along the path to comprehension that advocates 
should pave for the court.6 The advocate (and the client) risk 
sacrificing an opportunity to persuade, and may also risk having to 
spend valuable time fielding avoidable questions during a hearing 
or oral argument. 
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 Courts speak candidly about these hurdles and risks. The 5th 
Circuit, for example, likens judges to “sophisticated uninitiates” 
when they grapple with adversary submissions whose technical 
jargon escapes their understanding.7 “It is unhelpful,” says a 
federal district court, “when attorneys write briefs that presuppose 
specialized knowledge on the part of their readers.”8 
 “Dropping a judge in the middle of an alien landscape without 
a map and expecting him to get his bearings from fragments of 
testimony couched in occupational jargon to which he has not 
previously been exposed,” concludes another federal district 
court, “is not conducive to informed decisionmaking.”9 Yet 
another federal district court puts it more bluntly: 
Briefs “densely written and filled with technical 
jargon and unexplained . . . terms of art . . . 
increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and 
outright error.”10
A “Symbiotic Relationship”
 Two federal district courts acknowledge that 
judges maintain a “symbiotic relationship”11 with the 
advocates, who “educate the Court”12 with robust 
argument tailored to the judge’s circumstances. 
Symbiosis and tailoring mean that advocates convey 
no weakness or disrespect when they write about 
the facts and law in a professional tone using, as 
one federal district judge recommends, language 
“intelligible to everyday speakers of English.”13 
 In his latest book, retired 7th Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner 
confides that “judges do not feel patronized, or condescended to, 
when a lawyer explains in words of one syllable some scientific, 
technological, or other arcane feature of a case that is necessary to 
a full understanding. . . .  The judges are happy to be educated by 
the lawyers in the intricacies of a case.”14 Plain English remains an 
indispensable vehicle for fulfilling this educative role.
Generalist Judges
 Jargon might serve a legal writer’s purpose, or at least might 
not detract much from it, when the audience consists solely of 
readers who are trained in the writer’s specialty. But without this 
foundation of common understanding, says Judge Posner, “much 
legal jargon . . . can obscure rather than illuminate a particular 
case.”15  
 “There is nothing wrong with a specialized vocabulary — for use 
by specialists,” he explains. “Federal district and circuit judges, 
however, . . . are generalists. . . . Lawyers should understand the 
judges’ limited knowledge of specialized fields and choose their 
vocabulary accordingly.”16 
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 Judge Posner explains that “[i]ndividual judges often have 
specialized knowledge of a few fields of law, most commonly 
criminal law and sentencing, civil and criminal procedure, and 
federal jurisdiction, because these fields generate issues that 
frequently recur, but sometimes of other fields as well depending 
on the judge’s career before he became a judge or on special 
interests developed by him since.”17 These specialization limits, he 
adds, mean that an advocate “must not count on appellate judges’ 
being intimate with his particular legal nook — with its special 
jargon. . . .”18 
 Judge Posner’s antidote for advocates whose jargon risks 
thwarting effective communication with the court? “Every esoteric 
term . . . has a counterpart in ordinary English.”19 
 In New Medium LLC v. Barco N.V.,  Judge Posner reinforced 
his dictum about “ordinary English.”20 Sitting by designation as a 
trial judge in a complex patent case, he instructed counsel that  
“[a]ll submissions must be brief and non-technical and eschew 
patent-law jargon. Since I am neither an electrical engineer nor 
a patent lawyer, and since this case will be tried to a jury, . . . 
the parties’ lawyers must translate technical and legal jargon into 
ordinary language.”21
Administrative Review
 Because administrative rules and regulations often weave 
tangled doctrinal webs, the 5th Circuit specifies that jargon 
warrants an advocate’s close attention when the court reviews an 
agency decision. The court warns that with the passage of time, 
agency administrators may acquire “insights and experience 
denied judges. The subtleties . . . encased in jargon and tucked 
into interstices of the administrative scheme, may escape us.”22 
 “It is the responsibilities of the parties to properly educate 
the court,” adds a federal magistrate judge, “not of the court to 
improperly defer to an agency decision.”23
Conclusion: Persuading and Assisting the Court 
 After grappling with the parties’ jargon-laden briefs a few years 
ago, one judge issued this warning: “If in the future, a party’s 
briefs are as difficult to follow as these, the court may ask the party 
to rewrite the briefs.”24 
 Warning or no, the advocate is “a representative of clients [and] 
an officer of the legal system” under the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.25 Counsel fulfill these roles most skillfully 
with advocacy that heeds the dual aims that retired Judge Hugh 
R. Jones of the New York Court of Appeals identified on this 
Journal’s pages a generation ago. “First you seek to persuade 
the court of the merit of the client’s case, to create an emotional 
empathy for your position. Then you assist the court to reach a 
conclusion favorable to the client’s interest in terms of the analysis 
of the law and the procedural posture of the case.”26   
 Because oral argument in trial courts and appellate courts may 
be limited or eliminated, persuasion and assistance may depend 
heavily or entirely on the advocates’ written submissions. Skilled 
advocates reach generalist judges most effectively with forceful 
exposition of fact and law, free of undefined jargon and marked 
by the quartet that characterizes quality legal writing — precision, 
conciseness, simplicity, and clarity.27  
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